













































In the textbook economics world, markets are the most eﬃcient institu-
tion to allocate scarce resources. They clear all the time, equalizing demand
and supply, and proﬁt opportunities are arbitraged away. In particular, pro-
duction factors are predicted to be paid the marginal productivity of the
market-clearing factor. In the real world there are frictions, unobservable
characteristics, adjustment costs, erroneous expectations, and maybe dis-
crimination, all of which can distort the market equilibrium away from eﬃ-
cient allocation. This should not necessarily worry us economists, as the
theory is only intended to be a stylized version of reality. However, a sys-
tematic gap between costs (wages, in our case) and beneﬁts (productivity)
can provide information about crucial omissions from the theory.
A well-functioning labor market should perform at least two tasks:
matching workers with ﬁrms and setting wages. The ability of the labor
market to allocate workers to ﬁrms or industries with the highest produc-
tivity or the best future prospects is of particular importance for the likely
eﬀect of trade reforms, and this has been studied extensively—see Pavenik
(2002), Eslava et al. (2004), and Filhoz and Muendler (2006) for studies on
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11 CHI Bender ch11  5/29/08  12:47 PM  Page 345Latin American countries. Van Biesebroeck (2005) investigates the eﬀec-
tiveness of labor markets in several African countries, including the three
countries studied here, in performing this task, and ﬁnds that the realloca-
tion mechanism is less eﬀective than in the United States.
A second aspect of labor market eﬃciency is to determine a wage rate. If
labor markets function as spot markets with minimal frictions and infor-
mational asymmetries, we would expect arbitrage to set the remuneration
of characteristics at their productivity contribution. Otherwise, workers
are not provided with the proper incentives to invest in human capital char-
acteristics, such as schooling or tenure. While an important issue, it has not
been studied extensively, largely because of lack of suitable data. Employee
surveys do not contain information on ﬁrm level output and factor inputs
necessary to calculate productivity. Datasets on ﬁrms or plants generally
lack information on all but a few basic characteristics of the workforce.
The contribution of this chapter is foremost to provide evidence for three
sub-Saharan countries on the extent to which observed wage premiums for
a number of worker characteristics are equal to the productivity premiums
associated with those same characteristics. First, the methodology in
Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) is followed and the two premi-
ums are compared at the ﬁrm level. Here, the nature of the comparison is
implicitly between the wage bills and output levels of two ﬁrms that are
identical, except that one ﬁrm has a workforce with, on average, one more
year of schooling, or a higher fraction of male workers, and so on. We con-
sider ﬁve characteristics: gender, labor market experience, eduction, tenure
with the current employer, and whether a worker has followed a formal
training program. As some of the human capital characteristics are inﬂu-
enced by the workers, such as tenure or training, providing workers with
the correct investment incentives is crucial.
Labor market frictions are likely to be at least as important in developing
countries as in the more developed countries where most previous studies
were conducted. As stressed by Fafchamps (1997) in the introduction to a
symposium on “Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa,” one should be careful not
to assume outright that markets are eﬃcient, regardless of the institutions
required to perform their function. The model for Tanzania, Kenya, and
Zimbabwe is estimated. While all three countries are relatively poor, GDP
per capita for Zimbabwe exceeded that for Tanzania by a factor of ﬁve 
(during the sample period), while Kenya was intermediately developed.
A second contribution of the chapter is to estimate the ﬁrm-level pro-
duction function jointly with the individual-level wage equation. Using the
additional information of individual workers leads to more precise esti-
mates, especially of the wage premiums, and to a more accurate test. We
show how to test for equality between wage and productivity premiums in
this context and implement a feasible GLS estimator. While still allowing
for correlation between the error terms in the wage equation and produc-













































11 CHI Bender ch11  5/29/08  12:47 PM  Page 346tion function, we additionally introduce a random eﬀect in the wage equa-
tion that is shared by all workers with a common employer.
The main empirical ﬁnding is that in Tanzania, the poorest country we
consider, the wage premiums deviate substantially from the corresponding
productivity premiums. The gaps between wage and productivity premi-
ums are much smaller, and all are insigniﬁcant, in Zimbabwe. Results for
Kenya, an intermediate country in terms of level of development, are in-
termediate: equal remuneration can be rejected for some characteristics
(e.g., experience), but not for others (e.g., schooling). A test for equality of
all wage and productivity premiums on the ﬁrm-level estimates yields a p-
value of 1 percent in Tanzania, 18 percent in Kenya, and 64 percent in Zim-
babwe. Using the individual-level estimates, the corresponding p-values
are 0 percent, 1 percent, and 38 percent.
Moreover, the breakdown in correct remuneration in the two least de-
veloped countries follows a distinct patterns. On the one hand, wage pre-
miums exceed productivity premiums for general human capital charac-
teristics (experience and schooling). On the other hand, salaries hardly
increase for more ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital characteristics (tenure and
training), even though these have a clear productivity eﬀect. Equality of
the returns fails most pronouncedly for the two indicators that capture how
a worker’s salary rises over his or her career. Even though productivity rises
more with tenure than with experience,1 salaries rise only with experience
in Tanzania and much more with experience than with tenure in Kenya. In
contrast, in Zimbabwe, workers are predominantly rewarded for tenure,
consistent with the estimated productivity eﬀects.
Finally, we estimate the gaps between wage and productivity premiums
separately for ﬁrms that report facing international competition and those
that do not. While the results are somewhat noisy, equality of the two re-
turns is always less likely to be rejected for ﬁrms facing international com-
petition. The diﬀerence is most pronounced for labor market experience:
excessive salary increases over workers’ careers, compared to productivity
growth, are more moderate. It points to an additional channel through
which international trade can improve resource allocation.
There are a number of important debates in development economics
that would beneﬁt from a better understanding of the relationship between
wages and productivity. First, it is often argued that more education is a
prerequisite for economic growth—see, for example, Knight and Sabot
(1987). However, the Tanzanian ﬁrms in this sample have, on average, a
more educated workforce, but the productivity eﬀects of schooling fall far
short of the wage eﬀects. At the very least, higher education does not trans-













































1. In some cases, productivity declines less with tenure than with experience, or productiv-
ity declines with experience, but rises with tenure. Crucial is that, in relative terms, tenure has
a more positive eﬀect on productivity than experience, in all three countries.
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ductivity growth relies explicitly on the equality of relative wages and rela-
tive productivity. When labor growth is subtracted from output growth,
categories of workers are weighed by their wage shares—see, for example,
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). If the equality between wages and pro-
ductivity fails to hold systematically in developing countries, productivity
growth measures will be biased.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The measurement
framework to compare the wage and productivity premiums associated
with worker characteristics is introduced ﬁrst, in section 11.2, followed by
a discussion of the evidence for other regions in section 11.3. The em-
ployer-employee data and the countries included in the analysis are dis-
cussed next, in section 11.4. Results at the ﬁrm and individual level are pre-
sented with some robustness checks in section 11.5, and section 11.6
concludes.
11.2 A Measurement Framework
11.2.1 Wage and Productivity Premiums
The methodology we use to compare wage and productivity premiums
owes a great deal to Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999). If labor mar-
kets are eﬃcient, operate as a spot market, and ﬁrms minimize costs, the
wage premium of a worker should equal its productivity premium. Barring
imperfect information, any diﬀerence will be arbitraged away. Both premi-
ums can be identiﬁed by jointly estimating a wage equation and production
function, which characterize how wages and output depend on worker
characteristics.
As an example, assume that the productivity of male workers exceeds the
average productivity of female workers by  Μ percent. The production
function can be written as a function of capital and both types of labor
(men and women), which are assumed to be perfect substitutes:2
Q   Af[K, LF   (1    M) LM].
The ﬁrst-order conditions for cost minimization by the ﬁrm dictate that the
composition of the ﬁrm’s labor force is adjusted such that the relative wage
for both types of workers is equalized to the relative productivity ratio:
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2. Given suﬃciently detailed information on the labor force composition, this assumption
can be relaxed. In the robustness checks at the end, we allowed for imperfect substitutability
between experienced and unexperienced workers.
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(1)  M        M.
11.2.2 Firm-Level Estimation
The identiﬁcation of the productivity premium ( ) is necessarily done at
the plant or ﬁrm level. The wage premiums associated with worker charac-
teristics ( ) can be estimated using a standard wage equation derived from
the Mincer (1974) model of human capital. The most straightforward esti-
mation strategy is to aggregate the wage equation to the ﬁrm level and es-
timate it jointly with the production function—see, for example, Heller-
stein, Neumark, and Troske (1999).
Labor researchers have been concerned with a potential bias introduced
by unobserved worker ability in the wage equation. Productivity re-
searchers have estimated production functions controlling explicitly for
unobserved productivity diﬀerences. Joint estimation should to a large ex-
tent alleviate such concerns, as the bias works in the same direction in both
equations. A large component of the unobservables in both equations are
expected to represent the same factors.3 Results in Hellerstein and Neu-
mark (2004) demonstrate that the results tend to be relatively unaﬀected if
more sophisticated estimation strategies are employed.
Sticking with the earlier example, we now show how one can aggregate
an individual wage equation to identify the left-hand side premium in
equation (1). Deﬁne a wage equation for the individual as
Wi   wF Fi   wMMi.
The average wage paid to women is wF—Fi is a dummy that takes a value
of 1 if individual i is a woman—and wM to men. Summing over all workers
of the ﬁrm gives
W   wFLF   wMLM LF   LM   L
  wF L    – 1 LM 
  wF L 1    M  .
Taking logarithms and adding an additive error term, representing mea-
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3. See, for example, Frazer (2001), where this assumption is exploited to control for unob-
served ability in the wage equation.
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Nonlinear least squares estimation of the ﬁrm-level equation (2) produces
an estimate of the average baseline wage (wF) and of the gender wage pre-
mium ( M). The only information needed is the average wage and the pro-
portion of male workers by ﬁrm.
Assuming the Cobb-Douglas functional form for the production func-
tion, it can be written in logarithms as4
ln Q   ln A    K ln K    L ln L ˜   ε.
Male and female workers are aggregated in L ˜, where each type of employee
(LF and LM) is multiplied by its relative productivity level (1 or 1    M):
(2) L ˜   LF   (1    M)LM
  L 1    M  .
The total labor force is L   LF   LM. Substituting (3) in the production
function allows estimation of the gender productivity gap by nonlinear
least squares from just the proportion of male workers in each ﬁrm and the
usual output and input variables.
Generalizing this approach to construct a wage and production equa-
tion that takes more worker characteristics into account is limited by the
data. For example, diﬀerentiating workers by gender (M or F), experience
(Y or X—young versus high experience), and schooling (U or S—unedu-
cated versus highly educated), creates eight categories of workers: inex-
perienced, educated males, and so forth. Given that we observe a maxi-
mum of ten workers in each ﬁrm, the proportion of each category in the
ﬁrm’s workforce would be estimated extremely inaccurately. Furthermore,
it would be entirely impossible to look at any further characteristics or at
characteristics that divide the workforce more ﬁnely.
Making three assumptions for each characteristic—or rather, three sets
of assumptions, avoids this type of dimensional problem. For example, if
we assume that the relative number of male to female workers, the relative
productivity, and the relative wage by gender are all invariant to changes in
other characteristics, we can use the full workforce to estimate the gender
premiums. In eﬀect, this is an independence of irrelevant alternatives as-
sumption on the relative number of workers and the wage and productiv-
ity returns for each characteristic. In the previous example with three char-





















































4. It is straightforward to generalize the methodology to other functional forms. Hellerstein
and Neumark (2004) demonstrate that the qualitative results are very robust to alternative
speciﬁcations of the production function.
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Equal productivity:    ,
Equal wage premium:    ,
and similarly for young versus experienced workers and for uneducated
versus highly educated workers. This allows the simpliﬁcation of the labor
aggregate in the production function from eight terms, one for each worker
category, to three multiplicative factors, one for each characteristic:
(4) L ˜   LFYS   (1    FXS)LFXS   (1    MYS)LMYS   ...  
  (1    MXU)LMXU
  L 1    M   1    X   1    S  ,
and similarly in the wage equation. One can proceed in the same fashion to
add further characteristics to (5). These assumptions cannot be tested, or
they would not have been necessary. In the small sample of employees we
observe at each ﬁrm, some ratios will obviously not be equal, but this can
readily arise if only a limited number of employees is sampled.
The baseline model constructed so far is
(5) ln     0  ∑
K
k   1
ln  1    k     
(6) ln Q    0    K ln K    L ln L  ∑
K
k   1
ln 1    k      ε
where  0 is the base salary (in the previous example, for a female, inexperi-
enced, uneducated worker),  k is the wage premium and  k the productiv-
ity premium associated with characteristic k(k∈K). Equations (6) and (7)
are estimated jointly with Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression estima-
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5. As the fraction of workers with characteristics k enters equations (6) and (7) nonlinearly,
the point estimates of  k and  k will depend on the normalization (thanks to an anonymous
referee for pointing this out). However, the eﬀect is only noticeable for fractions that are far
away from 0.5, especially ‘male’ and to a lesser extent ‘training’. Because the correlations be-
tween fraction of male or fraction of female workers and all other variables are identical in
absolute value, the eﬀect of the normalization does not spill over to the estimates for returns
on other characteristics.
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While the previous approach allows identiﬁcation of the wage and pro-
ductivity premiums, it does not use all available information on the wage
side. We do observe salaries and characteristics for a sample of individual
workers at each ﬁrm. Rather than aggregating the wage equation to the
ﬁrm level, we can also estimate a Mincer wage equation jointly with the
production function. Estimating with a much larger number of observa-
tions—for example, for Tanzania with 520 individuals instead of 113 ﬁrms,
is likely to yield more precise estimates of the wage premiums.
As productivity can only be estimated at the ﬁrm level and the produc-
tivity premiums associated with each characteristic are still restricted as in
(4), we still use the same set of worker characteristics as before. The Min-
cer wage regression assumes additive separability of the returns to diﬀer-
ent characteristics, which is very similar to the equal wage premium as-
sumptions in (4). We follow the usual practice and estimate the wage
equation in logarithms:
ln Wi    0  ∑
K
k   1
 kXi
k    i.
The i subscript indexes individuals and the variable Xi
k is a dummy for
characteristic k (k ∈ K)—for example, the gender dummy Mi. This speci-
ﬁcation assumes that if a female worker has a salary of wF, the salary for a
male worker with otherwise equivalent characteristics would be wF
exp(wM). Expressed diﬀerently, the baseline salary for a worker with all
characteristics dummies equal to zero is exp(w0), while a worker with char-
acteristic Xk switched from zero to 1 has a salary equal to exp(w0   wk).
The equality in percentage terms of the productivity and wage premiums
associated with gender, as in equation (1), now boils down to
exp( M) – 1        M.
Expressed diﬀerently, for each of the characteristics k, we want to test
whether
wk   ln(1    k).
The individual wage equation is now estimated jointly with the ﬁrm-level
production function. As in the previous set-up, we still allow the errors in
the two equations to be correlated. In addition, we allow for a random
eﬀect in the wage equation to take into account that errors for employees
at the same ﬁrm are likely to be correlated. We implement the feasible gen-
eralized least squares (GLS) transformation as in Wooldridge (2000, 450)
and jointly estimate the transformed wage equation with the production
function. Because not all ﬁrms have the same number of employees sam-
MPM – MPF   
MPF
wM – wF  
wF
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assume that the reason for unbalancedness is random—not too unlikely
for our application—the adjustments are straightforward. All variables in
the wage equation are transformed according to
x
∗
ij   xij –  jx  j with  j   1 –   ,
with i indexing individuals and j ﬁrms. The estimate of the standard error
of the full residual combining individual errors and the random ﬁrm eﬀect
is se
2, which itself has an estimated standard error of sf
2. The number of em-
ployees sampled at ﬁrm j is Nj.6
11.3 Evidence from Other Regions
Matched employer-employee data sets contain the necessary informa-
tion to compare wage and productivity premiums, but their limited avail-
ability has lead to only a small number of previous studies.7 From the
observed employees, one can estimate average values of worker character-
istics for each employer. Hellerstein et al. (1999) pioneered the approach,
jointly estimating a plant-level wage equation with a production function
using U.S. administrative record information. They test for equality of 
the wage and productivity premiums associated with a number of charac-
teristics and only ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant discrepancy for the gen-
der dummy: women are only 16 percent less productive than their male
coworkers, but paid 45 percent less.
The bulk of the evidence for developed countries points toward equal
wage and productivity returns for various worker characteristics. Using
more recent 1990 U.S. data, Hellerstein and Neumark (2004) conﬁrm that
the wage gap between males and females exceeds the productivity gap. In
contrast, the lower wages for blacks is in line with productivity estimates,
and even though attaining “some college” education only attracts a 43 per-
cent wage premium while productivity is 67 percent higher, the diﬀerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant. Similar work for France in Pérez-Duarte,
Crepon, and Deniau (2001) and for Israel in Hellerstein and Neumark
(1999) ﬁnds no gender discrimination. In a study for Norway, Haegeland
and Klette (1999) also ﬁnds that wage premiums for gender and eduction
are in line with productivity premiums.
The only characteristics in those studies for which the wage premium
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6. How to estimate the diﬀerent standard errors is elaborated on in Wooldridge (1999, 
260–261).
7. A conference symposium in the Monthly Labor Review (July 1998) provides an overview
of sources; see also Haltiwanger et al. (1999).
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wegian workers with eight to ﬁfteen years of experience, the productivity
premium exceeds the wage premium, while the opposite is true for workers
with more than ﬁfteen years of experience.
Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen (2006) focus on the eﬀects of training
using an industry-level data set covering the U.K. manufacturing sector.
They separately estimate wage equations and production functions and ﬁnd
that the productivity eﬀect of training substantially exceeds the wage eﬀect,
but no formal test is presented. They conclude that the usual approach in
the literature of quantifying the beneﬁts of training by looking at wages un-
derestimates the impact. Another ﬁnding is that aggregation to the industry
magniﬁes the eﬀect of training, potentially due to externalities.
The only similar study in a developing country, Jones (2001) estimates a
ﬁrm-level production function jointly with an individual-level wage equa-
tion for Ghana. However, no details are given regarding the assumptions
on the variance-covariance matrix when the individual- and ﬁrm-level data
is combined.8 She ﬁnds that women are 42 percent to 62 percent less pro-
ductive, depending on the speciﬁcation, and paid 12 percent to 15 percent
less. No formal test is reported, but the standard errors are fairly large. Her
focus is on the premiums associated with an extra year of schooling, which
are estimated similarly in the production function and the wage equation:
both are around 7 percent. When discrete levels of education attainment
are used, the results are ambiguous. The diﬀerences in point estimates are
large, but the education coeﬃcients in the production function are esti-
mated imprecisely and none of the formal tests ﬁnds a statistically signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence.9
Bigsten et al. (2000) gauges the link between wages and productivity in-
directly, similar to the U.K. analysis. First, they estimate the returns to ed-
ucation in ﬁve sub-Saharan countries using a wage equation. Then, they
separately estimate the production function, including lagged levels of ed-
ucation as a proxy for human capital. They ﬁnd that the implied rate of re-
turn to human capital is very low—in particular, it is only a fraction of the
return to physical capital.
11.4 Data
11.4.1 Countries
The three countries included in the sample are middle-sized former
British colonies in East Africa that obtained independence in the early













































8. We contacted the author to obtain further information, but did not receive a response.
9. Many diﬀerences are large in absolute value—ﬁve of the eight estimated diﬀerentials ex-
ceed 20 percent—but the direction of the diﬀerence varies by schooling level.
11 CHI Bender ch11  5/29/08  12:47 PM  Page 3541960s.10 The World Bank classiﬁes all three as low income, even though
they diﬀer substantially by level of development. One way to see this is
from GDP per capita, which stood at $477 (in purchasing power parity
[PPP]) in Tanzania, less than half of the $1,092 attained in Kenya, and only
slightly more than one ﬁfth of the GDP per capita of Zimbabwe—all ﬁg-
ures are for 1991 and reported in table 11.1. The diﬀerences are smaller on
the United Nations’ human development index, which also takes educa-
tion and life expectancy into account, but the order is the same. In the most
recent ranking, Tanzania occupies the 151st (or 22nd last) place with
0.440, putting it in the “low development” category. Kenya and Zimbabwe
rank rather closely at places 134 and 128, with a score of 0.513 and 0.551,
respectively, near the bottom of the “medium development” group.11
The diﬀerent development levels of the countries are also reﬂected in the
share of workers employed in industry.12 Only 4.7 percent of all employ-
ment in Tanzania is in industry, while it is almost twice as high in Zim-
babwe (8.6 percent) and intermediate in Kenya (7.3 percent). In Tanzania,
the transition from agriculture to other sectors had only just begun: agri-
culture comprised almost half the workforce at the end of the 1990s. In
Kenya, the transformation was in full swing: the employment share of agri-
culture declined from 42 percent in 1975 to 27.5 percent by the sample pe-
riod. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, has seen a stable 18.5 percent of its
workforce employed in agriculture for the last twenty-ﬁve years.
Given that Zimbabwe is much more advanced in its industrial transfor-
mation, it is not surprising that it far surpasses the other two countries in
GDP per capita. The diﬀerence in labor productivity in industry is even
more stark. While industry workers in Kenya produce twice as much as
Tanzanian workers, Zimbabwe’s output per worker outstrips Tanzania by
a factor of seven and Kenya by a factor of four. It underscores the impor-
tance of developing a strong manufacturing sector. World Bank (2000) sta-
tistics also show that manufacturing workers in Tanzania earn 3.5 times
more, on average, than agricultural workers, while the ratio stands at 5.7 in
Kenya and even 9.9 in Zimbabwe.
Infrastructure statistics conﬁrm the diﬀerent levels of development of
the three countries. Zimbabwe had 22km of paved highways per 1000 km2













































10. Unfortunately, only three countries could be included in the analysis due to data con-
straints. A partial analysis was possible with data from Cameroon (almost as developed as
Zimbabwe) and Burundi (even less developed than Tanzania), but the sample size is smaller,
some variables (e.g. capital) are measured less accurately, and other variables (e.g. training in
Burundi) are missing. Results for these countries are in between the extremes of Tanzania and
Zimbabwe. The failure of the equality between wage and productivity premiums to hold is
much more pronounced in Burundi than in Cameroon: the p-values for the joint test, corre-
sponding to the ﬁrst joint test in table 11.3, were, respectively, 0.03 and 0.22.
11. Norway tops the human development ranking with a score of 0.942.
12. Manufacturing employment that corresponds to manufacturing value added was not
available for Tanzania in 1991.
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15km and 4km. The same ranking is preserved in kilometers of railroad by
area at, respectively, eight, ﬁve, and four kilometers, or airports per million
inhabitants: 1.4 in Zimbabwe, 0.6 in Kenya, and 0.3 in Tanzania. In fact,
almost any conceivable statistic that one expects to be correlated with de-
velopment produces the same ranking: access to clean water, telephone
penetration, school enrollments, infant mortality, and so forth.13
The three countries also diﬀer substantially in their exposure to interna-













































13. Only life expectancy at birth gives a reverse ranking, but this is due to the staggering
HIV infection rate, aﬀecting one third of the adult population in Zimbabwe and almost one-
sixth in Kenya.
Table 11.1 Summary statistics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
Population 26.3m 24.3m 10.0m
Percent employed in industry 4.9 7.3 8.6
Manufacturing workersa 126312 177738 187937
GDP / capita (PPP) 477 1092 2201
VA / employee in industry (USD)b 983 1705 7049
Median LP in samplec 38 100 142
Median TFP in samplec 54 100 143
Monthly wage in sample (USD) 55.9 (58.6) 117.0 (322.2) 203.3 (261.3)
Exports as % of domestic prod.d 8.8 23.5 23.6
Imports as % of domestic cons. 76.9 73.3 50.3
Manufacturing exports as % of total 6.1 20.9 40.5
Export participation in the sample (%) 9 22 49
Share of manuf. GDP covered 0.31 0.17 0.26
Share of manuf. labor force covered 0.15 0.12 0.31
Number of ﬁrms 113 183 110
Workers per ﬁrm 97.3 89.8 269.8
Workers interviewed per ﬁrm 4.6 6.2 5.5
Male (%) 0.79 (0.40) 0.87 (0.34) 0.84 (0.36)
Age (years) 35.3 (10.5) 34.1 (9.4) 37.0 (10.4)
Experience (years) 16.4 (10.4) 16.1 (9.8) 19.9 (10.8)
Schooling (years) 12.4 (4.8) 11.5 (3.8) 11.0 (3.6)
Tenure (years) 7.8 (6.9) 7.9 (7.2) 10.3 (8.2)
Received training (%) 0.09 (0.29) 0.12 (0.32) 0.21 (0.41)
Source: World Bank (2000) and own calculations for the sample statistics.




cRelative to Kenya, see Van Biesebroeck (2005).
dTrade statistics are for 1993. The trade share is for manufacturing only, and manufacturing
sales is assumed to be double of value added.
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is almost three times higher in Zimbabwe than in Tanzania, 23.6 percent
versus 8.8 percent, but almost as high in Kenya. On the import side, we see
that only in Zimbabwe domestic production accounts for half of the total
domestic consumption. In the other two countries, approximately three-
quarters of all manufactures consumed are imported. This aggregate trade
exposure is reﬂected in the export participation rate for the ﬁrms in the
sample. The diﬀerences are even more pronounced, with ﬁrms in Zim-
babwe more than ﬁve times as likely to export than Tanzanian ﬁrms. The
importance of the manufacturing sector in the three countries is well illus-
trated by the share of total export earnings accounted for by the manufac-
turing sector. This rises from a mere 6.1 percent in Tanzania, to 20.9 per-
cent in Kenya, and a full 40.5 percent in Zimbabwe.
11.4.2 Firms and Workers
In 1991, Tanzania and Kenya each counted approximately twenty-ﬁve
million inhabitants, while Zimbabwe only had ten million. The manufac-
turing sector, which we focus on, is more evenly sized because of its greater
importance in Zimbabwe. All countries count between 126,000 and
188,000 manufacturing workers. A stratiﬁed sample of manufacturing
ﬁrms in three consecutive years provides the micro data used in the anal-
ysis.14 Approximately 200 ﬁrms were surveyed each year in each country,
covering four broadly deﬁned manufacturing sectors: food, textile and
clothing, wood and furniture, and metal and equipment. A maximum of
ten employees per ﬁrm were interviewed each year. While ﬁrms could be
linked over time as a panel, this was not possible for the workers. Because
questions on training were not asked in the third year, we only use the ﬁrst
two years in the analysis.
The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel of ﬁrms with, on average,
110 to 183 observations per year in each country. In the ﬁrst year, the ﬁrms
employed 19,383 to 58,108 workers and 619 to 1,206 of them were inter-
viewed. A large part of the manufacturing sector is covered by this sample.
The value added produced by the sample ﬁrms makes up 31 percent of
manufacturing GDP in Tanzania, 17 percent in Kenya, and 26 percent in
Zimbabwe. The share of all manufacturing workers who are employed by
ﬁrms included in the sample is substantially lower in the ﬁrst two countries,
a result of the higher productivity levels achieved by larger ﬁrms.
The diﬀerences between the countries described earlier are equally
apparent when we compare the ﬁrms in the sample. The median ﬁrm in
Tanzania achieves only 38 percent of the labor productivity level of the me-
dian ﬁrm in Kenya, while labor productivity in Zimbabwe is 42 percent













































14. The data was collected between 1991 and 1995 by three diﬀerent research teams, coor-
dinated by the Regional Program of Enterprise Development at the World Bank. Firms were
sampled to give (the ﬁrm of) each manufacturing worker equal probability to be included in
the sample—an implicit stratiﬁcation by employment size.
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Biesebroeck (2005), show similar diﬀerences when capital intensity is
taken into account. The median ﬁrm in Kenya is twice as productive as in
Tanzania, but achieves only two-thirds of the productivity level of the me-
dian ﬁrm in Zimbabwe. The salary diﬀerences between the countries match
the labor productivity diﬀerences rather well. Workers in Tanzania earn
27.4 percent of the average salary in Zimbabwe, while the median labor
productivity of their employers stands at 26.8 percent. Salaries in Kenya,
on average $120 (in 1991 USD), are slightly lower than one would predict
from the relative labor productivity, which would imply a salary of ap-
proximately $140. The statistics for the sample conﬁrm that Zimbabwe is
by far the most developed country of the three, while Tanzania is lagging
far behind.
The remainder of table 11.1 provides averages and standard errors for
the variables used in the analysis. Workers in Zimbabwe work, on average,
in larger ﬁrms, are slightly older, stay longer with the same ﬁrm and are
more likely to receive (or choose to enroll in) formal training once they are
employed. The sample of workers in Kenya is even more dominated by
males than in the other countries. In Tanzania, workers receive the lowest
salaries, but paradoxically they have the highest years of schooling. How
these characteristics are rewarded is analyzed in the next section.
11.5 Results
The discussion of the estimation results is organized in the same three
subsections as the earlier discussion of the measurement framework. This
is followed by a discussion of some robustness checks and an analysis of the
importance of trade exposure.
11.5.1 Wage and Productivity Premiums
Information on productivity is only available at the ﬁrm level and, hence,
the identiﬁcation of the productivity premiums necessarily exploits between-
firm variation. For wages, we have the option to exploit only between-ﬁrm
variation as well, in which case individual wages have to be aggregated 
to the ﬁrm level. Alternatively we can incorporate the information con-
tained in the individual wages in the estimation. We will employ both
strategies, but ﬁrst we look at the wage equation in isolation to verify
whether the estimated wage premiums for worker characteristics diﬀer in
important ways when we limit identiﬁcation to between-ﬁrm or within-
ﬁrm variation.15













































15. The working paper version, Van Biesebroeck (2003), shows additional results for the in-
dividual level wage equation. A full survey of the returns to education estimated from Mincer
wage regressions in sub-Saharan Africa is in Appleton, Hoddinott, and Mackinnon (1996).
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within and between ﬁrms; results for the three countries are in the columns
labeled “total” in table 11.2. For example, the positive salary premium for
male workers can be the result of men receiving, on average, higher salaries
than women within a given ﬁrm, or men can be disproportionately em-
ployed in ﬁrms that pay higher salaries, a between eﬀect, even without dif-
ferential pay by gender. In the columns labeled “within” and “between,” we
separate the two eﬀects. Within estimates are obtained using the standard
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator (including ﬁrm-year ﬁxed eﬀects) and between esti-
mates are obtain by averaging all variables by ﬁrm-year and estimating
with least squares.
All ﬁve characteristics are measured as dummy variables. Experience is
coded as 1 if a worker attained more labor market experience than the me-
dian (interviewed) worker for the country, and tenure is deﬁned similarly.
The schooling dummy takes on a value of 1 if the worker has at least at-
tended secondary school, but not necessarily ﬁnished it. The training
dummy is switched on for workers who completed a formal training pro-
gram (excluding on-the-job training) after they ﬁnished their formal edu-
cation or apprenticeship.
The main message from table 11.2 is that in all but two cases the between
estimates are of the same sign as the total estimates and in most cases even
the magnitudes are very similar. The only two instances where the signs do
not correspond—tenure in Tanzania and gender in Zimbabwe—the be-
tween coeﬃcient is estimated extremely imprecisely and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (the t-values are 0.46 and 0.78). One pattern to note is
that for Zimbabwe four of the ﬁve between estimates exceed the total esti-
mates, with the reverse being true for the within estimates. At least for Zim-
babwe, identifying wage premiums from between-ﬁrm variation tends to
overestimate the unconditional premiums in a sample of workers.
The magnitudes of the wage premiums for diﬀerent characteristics seem
reasonable. Male workers earn substantially more, but a gender wage pre-
mium of 10.5 percent to 28.6 percent is not unreasonably large. In the ﬁrst
two countries, the pay diﬀerential by gender is larger between ﬁrms than
within, while in Zimbabwe the between estimate surprisingly turns nega-
tive. Only in Zimbabwe are female workers concentrated in higher-paying,
larger ﬁrms. Experience and schooling premiums are estimated surpris-
ingly similar in the three countries, especially the wage gradient within
ﬁrms. Diﬀerences are more pronounced for tenure and training: for both
variables, workers in Zimbabwe are rewarded more generously than in the
other two countries. The tenure premium in Zimbabwe is exclusively driven
by the between eﬀect, indicating that salaries do not really increase with
tenure, but ﬁrms that pay higher salaries have lower worker attrition.
While we could have included occupation controls, we follow the con-
vention in the literature not to do so. A substantial fraction of the return 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11 CHI Bender ch11  5/29/08  12:47 PM  Page 360to human capital characteristics will materialize through occupation
changes—for example, promotions, which are surely endogenous.16
11.5.2 Firm-Level Estimation
The SUR estimation results for equations (6) and (7) by country, with
discretely measured worker characteristics, are in table 11.3. In this and all
following speciﬁcations, hours worked and time, industry, and location
dummies are added as controls in both the wage equation and production
function. The production function always has to be estimated at the ﬁrm
level, and here we aggregate the wage equation to the same level. Results
in the following section are for the individual wage equation jointly esti-
mated with the ﬁrm production function, which severely complicates the
estimation.
Larger ﬁrms tend to pay higher salaries, in line with evidence for many
African countries in Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2002), although the eﬀect
is small in Tanzania. The capital and labor elasticities in the Cobb-Douglas
production function are estimated similarly in the three countries, with la-
bor somewhat more important in Zimbabwe and the capital coeﬃcient
highest in Kenya. Returns to scale are moderately increasing in each coun-
try. The sum of the two input coeﬃcients ranges from 1.041 to 1.141, in line
with results for the manufacturing sector in other developing countries, as
surveyed in Tybout (2000).
Consistent with the results for the individual wage data in table 11.2, we
ﬁnd the highest wage premium for males in Tanzania and the estimate in
Kenya is approximately 10 percent lower. However, these salary gaps fall
far short of the higher productivity realized by ﬁrms that employ a high
percentage of male workers. The extremely high point estimates on the
male dummy in the production function imply that raising the fraction of
males by one standard deviation would raise output by 32 percent in Tan-
zania, by 40 percent in Kenya, but only by 2 percent in Zimbabwe. Given
that wage premiums for males are below the corresponding productivity
premiums, it suggests that men are underpaid, although none of the diﬀer-
ences is statistically signiﬁcant. These estimates are somewhat misleading
though, because the majority of ﬁrms in the sample employ only male
workers. The choice not to employ any female workers is undoubtedly re-
lated to the line of work a ﬁrm carries out. The productivity premium by
gender is also estimated extremely imprecisely, and in the following we will
mostly disregard the gender variable.
The wage premiums associated with experience are not estimated very
precisely either, except in Tanzania, but the point estimates again corre-
spond well to the between results in table 11.2; only the return to experi-













































16. Results in Van Biesebroeck (2003) illustrate that 28 percent to 55 percent of the return
to schooling and education is associated with occupation changes.
11 CHI Bender ch11  5/29/08  12:47 PM  Page 361ence in Zimbabwe is estimated rather low. Salaries rise substantially with
experience in Tanzania and Kenya, but not in Zimbabwe, where education
is rewarded higher than in the other two countries. The impact of experi-
ence in the production function follows a peculiar pattern: the relative size
of the productivity premiums in the three countries is exactly the opposite
of the wage premiums ranking. In the country where salaries are most re-
sponsive to experience, Tanzania, the productivity of ﬁrms drops with the
experience/age of the workforce. The country that rewards experience the
least, Zimbabwe, is the only one where experience is associated with a pos-
itive productivity eﬀect. The gap between the wage and productivity pre-
mium associated with experience is more than 50 percent larger in Kenya
than in Zimbabwe, and the gap in Tanzania is almost three times as large
as in Zimbabwe. For Tanzania, we can reject equality between the two pre-













































Table 11.3 A market efﬁciency test: Production function and wage equation at the ﬁrm level
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
Dependent variable: Wage Output Wage Output Wage Output
Labor 0.035 0.781 0.136 0.851 0.200 0.901
(.025) (.082) (.020) (.070) (.035) (.068)
Capital 0.260 0.290 0.228
(.041) (.039) (.040)
Male 0.537 1.386 0.422 2.186 –0.137 0.062
(.235) (1.32) (.211) (1.59) (.182) (.313)
Experience 0.308 –0.404 0.193 –0.205 0.119 0.349
(.147) (.229) (.126) (.233) (.221) (.357)
Schooling 0.717 0.162 0.467 0.077 1.289 1.764
(.175) (.401) (.133) (.270) (.463) (.781)
Tenure –0.075 –0.249 0.063 0.366 0.470 0.801
(.104) (.271) (.115) (.407) (.246) (.410)
Received training –0.074 0.700 0.029 0.560 0.295 0.231
(.157) (.810) (.125) (.476) (.195) (.254)
Test for equality of coefﬁcients in both equations (p-values)
Joint test (all 5 characteristics) 0.01 0.18 0.64
Joint test—without male 0.01 0.23 0.73
Joint test—general HC 0.00 0.15 0.72
Joint test—ﬁrm-speciﬁc HC 0.55 0.42 0.73
Joint test—learning 0.29 0.28 0.42
Joint test—over time 0.00 0.21 0.79
Observations 266 375 213
R2 0.27 0.71 0.41 0.80 0.45 0.87
Note:Controls added to both the wage equation and the production function are hours worked and year,
industry, and location dummies. Estimation is with SUR. Experience and schooling are grouped as
general human capital (HC) characteristics, with tenure and training grouped as ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital. “Learning” combines schooling and training and “over time” combines experience and tenure.
11 CHI Bender ch11  5/29/08  12:47 PM  Page 362miums at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level and for Kenya at the 10 percent
level.
For schooling, the size of the productivity premiums follows the same
pattern between countries as the wage premiums: highest in Zimbabwe,
lowest in Kenya, and intermediate in Tanzania. Still, in the two least-
developed economies, educated workers are able to secure a wage premium
that far outstrips the productivity contribution of education. In Zim-
babwe, on the other hand, the diﬀerence goes the other way. Similarly as for
experience, the gap between the wage and productivity premium associ-
ated with schooling is by far the largest in Tanzania and Kenya.
The tenure variable, which measures whether an employee has stayed
more than the median number of years with his or her current employer, is
associated with particularly large salary increases in Zimbabwe (47 per-
cent). In the other two countries, salaries do not rise with tenure, only with
experience. Strikingly, in each country the productivity eﬀect of tenure
largely exceeds that of experience. The same is true for the training dummy.
In the two least-developed countries, workers who receive training are not
paid a higher salary, even though training has a large (but imprecisely esti-
mated) eﬀect on productivity. In Zimbabwe, the wage premium for work-
ers marginally exceeds the productivity eﬀect.
Combined with the higher wage premium for tenure than for experience,
the compensation pattern in Zimbabwe is likely to help reduce worker
turnover, especially of those valuable employees that received training.
This is borne out by a cursory look at the correlation between training and
tenure at the individual level. Controlling for experience, workers with a
longer tenure are more likely to have completed a training program. On av-
erage, workers that have completed training were employed for half a year
longer at their current employer. The relationship is particularly strong in
Zimbabwe, but hardly noticeable in Kenya.
A joint test for the hypothesis that for the four variables that determine
the level of human capital in a ﬁrm (experience, schooling, tenure, and
training) wage premiums equal productivity premiums is rejected for Tan-
zania at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level. For Kenya, it can only be rejected
if we are willing to tolerate a 23 percent signiﬁcance level. The hypothesis
can never be rejected for Zimbabwe, as the p-value is 73 percent. The tests
follow the same pattern if we include the male dummy, with the p-value
somewhat lower for Kenya and even higher for Zimbabwe.
Performing separate tests for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc aspects of human capital
(tenure and training) and general human capital (experience and school-
ing) points to the general characteristics driving the correlation between
equality of returns and development level of the country. Firms in all three
countries are rewarding ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics more closely in pro-
portion to the productivity gains they bring. The p-values on these joint













































11 CHI Bender ch11  5/29/08  12:47 PM  Page 363tests are always high, although it should be noted that the eﬀects are esti-
mated especially imprecisely for Tanzania and Kenya.
In contrast, the diﬀerences between countries are especially stark for
general human capital characteristics. The p-value is 0.00 for Tanzania,
0.15 for Kenya, and 0.72 for Zimbabwe. Grouping characteristics diﬀer-
ently—schooling and training (learning), on the one hand, and experience
and tenure (over time), on the other—points again to the importance of ex-
perience. The underlying tendency is for salaries to increase over time with
experience in Tanzania and Kenya and with tenure in Zimbabwe, while
productivity is more closely related to tenure than to experience in each
country.
Even at the ﬁrm level, coeﬃcients on the worker characteristics are esti-
mated more precisely in the wage equation than in the production func-
tion, although the R2 tends to be higher in the latter. Comparing the diﬀer-
ent countries, standard errors are somewhat larger for Zimbabwe than for
Kenya or Tanzania. However, the coeﬃcient estimates also tend to be
larger (in absolute value) for Zimbabwe, with the exception of the male and
training dummies even uniformly so. While the average t-statistic in the
wage equation is somewhat higher in Tanzania (1.93) and Kenya (1.56)
than in Zimbabwe (1.48), the average t-statistic in the production function
is higher in Zimbabwe (1.26) than in Tanzania (1.00) or Kenya (0.92). Only
for the male dummy is the t-statistic in Zimbabwe below those in the other
two countries. There is thus no evidence that the higher p-values for Zim-
babwe are simply due to more-imprecisely estimated coeﬃcients.
11.5.3 Individual-Level Estimation
While the joint tests at the bottom of table 11.3 for the results at the ﬁrm
level showed a clear pattern, many of the wage and productivity premiums
were estimated imprecisely. Incorporating the information on individual
employees avoids aggregation of the wage equation and is likely to improve
precision, especially for the wage premiums. The estimation results using
the wage equation at the individual level with the methodology outlined
previously are in table 11.4. The increase in precision is very large for all co-
eﬃcients in the wage equation: on average, standard errors have decreased
by a factor of three. The production function coeﬃcients are estimated
more precisely as well, especially in Tanzania. While all ﬁrms were treated
identically in the ﬁrm level estimation, the current results implicitly weigh
ﬁrms by the number of employees that are sampled, which partly explains
the nonnegligible changes in the point estimates of both equations.
The labor and capital coeﬃcients have changed the least; only the results
for Tanzania are somewhat closer to those for Kenya and Zimbabwe. In the
wage equation, all premiums are now estimated positively, in line with our
priors. While most of the point estimates for Tanzania and Zimbabwe are
slightly lower in absolute value than before, the estimates for Kenya are
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returns to worker characteristics in the production function are estimated
lower than before in absolute value. The relative position of the countries,
however, is by and large unchanged.
The average size (the absolute value) of the gap between wage and pro-
ductivity premiums in Tanzania went from 61.2 percent for the ﬁrm-level
results to 49.3 percent for the individual results, from 67.6 percent to 22.7
percent in Kenya, and from 26.0 percent to 24.1 percent in Zimbabwe.
Even though the absolute value of the diﬀerences declined, the standard er-
rors declined even more, resulting in more of the gaps being signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The same joint tests as before yield almost uniformly
lower p-values; see the results at the bottom of table 11.4.
The rejection of equality of the wage and productivity premiums for













































Table 11.4 A market efﬁciency test: Firm-level production function and individual 
wage equation
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
Dependent variable: Wage Output Wage Output Wage Output
Labor 0.057 0.864 0.074 0.701 0.208 0.850
(.024) (.035) (.018) (.029) (.022) (.028)
Capital 0.238 0.326 0.262
(.047) (.019) (.017)
Male 0.340 0.878 0.089 0.117 0.115 0.217
(.052) (.431) (.045) (.267) (.068) (.178)
Experience 0.237 –0.639 0.283 –0.238 0.271 0.347
(.047) (.069) (.039) (.152) (.064) (.186)
Schooling 0.503 –0.289 0.470 0.268 0.567 1.109
(.054) (.121) (.039) (.194) (.068) (.313)
Tenure 0.080 0.099 0.104 0.067 0.203 0.592
(.046) (.174) (.036) (.214) (.219) (.193)
Received training 0.039 0.281 0.104 0.453 0.177 0.079
(.069) (.273) (.048) (.290) (.069) (.112)
Test for equality of coefﬁcients in both equations (p-values)
Joint test (all 5 characteristics) _ 0.00 0.01 0.67
Joint test—without male 0.00 0.01 0.59
Joint test—general HC 0.00 0.02 0.52
Joint test—ﬁrm-speciﬁc HC 0.63 0.40 0.41
Joint test—learning 0.00 0.19 0.36
Joint test—over time 0.00 0.00 0.48
Observations 1215 266 2180 375 1162 213
R2 0.74 0.73 0.44 0.75 0.32 0.83
Note: Controls added to both the wage equation and the production function are as before: hours
worked and year, industry, and location dummies. Estimation is with SUR. The production function is
at the ﬁrm level, while the wage equation is at the individual level and has ﬁrst been transformed to al-
low for a random ﬁrm effect. Groupings of characteristics for the joint tests are the same as in table 11.3.
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The t-statistic associated with the “excess return” to experience is now
10.5, but the “excess return” to schooling now also yields a t-statistic of 6.1.
Moreover, the direction of the diﬀerences is the same as before: experience
and schooling are over-rewarded, while tenure and training are under-
rewarded, although not signiﬁcantly so. The same is true for Kenya, but
less pronouncedly. Only one general human capital characteristics is
clearly over-rewarded—experience—and only training receives a salary
premium below the productivity eﬀect, although the gap is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Results for Zimbabwe are by and large similar as before, although the
standard errors in the wage equation are somewhat higher than in the other
two countries. The average size of the gap between wage and productivity
premiums is still the lowest of the three countries, at least if we exclude gen-
der, but the lower precision makes the tests less powerful in Zimbabwe. In
contrast with the other two countries, the only two characteristics for
which the gap is more than 10 percent are schooling and tenure, and both
are rewarded below their contribution to productivity.
11.5.4 Robustness Checks
The working paper version of this chapter contains a number of sensi-
tivity analyses that demonstrate the robustness of the results—see Van
Biesebroeck (2003) for details. First, the ﬁndings are very similar using
continuous measures (years) of experience, tenure, and schooling. In the
two least-developed countries, workers are still estimated to secure sub-
stantial pay increases over their career that are not matched by any dis-
cernible productivity eﬀect. The wage return to schooling also exceeds its
eﬀect on productivity in each country, but the extent diﬀers widely. As be-
fore, the excess returns (the gap between the salary and productivity pre-
miums) for experience and schooling are highest in Tanzania, at respec-
tively, 4.8 percent per year of labor market experience and 6.0 percent per
year of education. The gaps are sizeable in Kenya as well, at 2.8 percent and
3.3 percent. In Zimbabwe, the gaps are only 0.3 percent and 1.2 percent,
and formal statistical tests do not reject equality of the returns (p-values
are 0.81 and 0.75). In the two least-developed countries, equality of the re-
turns to experience can be ﬁrmly rejected, even at a 1 percent signiﬁcance
level. The same holds for schooling in Tanzania (albeit only at a 10 percent
signiﬁcance level), but not in Kenya.
Second, given that the rejection of equality between wage and produc-
tivity premiums in Tanzania and Kenya is to a large extent driven by the ex-
perience premiums, we have reestimated the model, relaxing the assump-
tion that workers with high and low experience are perfect substitutes. We
introduce two separate labor aggregates (L ˜
X and L ˜
Y) in the model; each is
adjusted by multiplicative factors to control for the other worker charac-













































11 CHI Bender ch11  5/29/08  12:47 PM  Page 366teristics—as in equation (5).17 To be as ﬂexible as possible on the produc-
tion side, we adopted a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) speciﬁca-
tion, which allows not only the weight on each labor aggregate, but also the
elasticity of substitution between the two aggregates to be determined by
the data. This requires a modiﬁcation in the test for equality between the
two premiums, but we refer to Van Biesebroeck (2003; section 7.2) for de-
tails. The results are qualitatively similar to the results in table 11.3, which
assume perfect substitutability. This is not surprising given that the esti-
mates for the elasticity of substitution between young and experienced
workers are relatively high: 3.0 for Kenya, 6.3 for Tanzania, and inﬁnity for
Zimbabwe. The p-value on the joint test for Kenya is even lower than in
table 11.3.
Third, even though we did not observe the entire workforce for most
ﬁrms, we could proceed with the estimation by using the sample of ob-
served employees to estimate the fraction of male, educated (and so forth)
workers at each ﬁrm. While these are estimated quantities, we have treated
them as the true means. Van Biesebroeck (2003) reports results from two
Monte Carlo exercises that investigate how sensitive the ﬁndings are to the
noise that enters the estimation procedure in this way. A ﬁrst exercise re-
peatedly samples for each ﬁrm a diﬀerent sample of employees from the
hypothetical workforce (as implied by the estimated means) and proceeds
with the estimation as before. A second exercise uses Bayes’ law (based on
the estimated means) to assign probabilities to randomly generated values
for each characteristic. These probabilities are then used as weights in the
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), where each ﬁrm is assigned ran-
domly generated average characteristics.
For both exercises, the average p-values are slightly below the p-values
for Tanzania and Kenya in table 11.3, rejecting equality strongly. In the sec-
ond, exercise, the p-value for Zimbabwe is much reduced, although it re-
mains more than twice as high as the one for Kenya. Given that, on aver-
age, a smaller fraction of each ﬁrm’s workforce is sampled in Zimbabwe, it
was expected that sampling would introduce greater variation for Zim-
babwe. Still, the qualitative ﬁnding that “the likelihood of rejecting equal-
ity between wage and productivity premiums is decreasing with the level of
development” still applies.
11.5.5 Trade Exposure
In addition to the diﬀerences between countries, there are bound to be
diﬀerences between individual ﬁrms within each country. One crucial dis-
tinction between ﬁrms is to what extent they are exposed to competition













































17. Data limitations force us to still use the entire workforce to estimate the fraction of male
workers, highly educated workers, and so on. In principle, it is possible to let the ratio of male
workers as well as the wage and productivity premiums associated with gender vary by expe-
rience category.
11 CHI Bender ch11  5/29/08  12:47 PM  Page 367from foreign ﬁrms. Firms that operate in a highly competitive product en-
vironment might also have to compete harder on the labor market to at-
tract good employees. To export successfully, ﬁrms need a high-quality
product, possibly requiring more highly skilled workers. To survive in an
industry facing a lot of import competition, producing eﬃciently is crucial
and investments in human capital might be one way to achieve process in-
novations. In any case, strong competition in the output market will make
it harder to oﬀer wage premiums for worker characteristics that do not
contribute to productivity.
Results in table 11.5 are for two subsamples that pool ﬁrms from all
countries, but separate ﬁrms that face international competition from
those that do not. Firms “exposed to trade” are those that exported, or that
indicated that the main source of competition they faced was from (a) im-
ported goods, from (b) local production by foreign or multinational ﬁrms,
or from (c) foreign ﬁrms on export markets.18
Results using the ﬁrm-level estimator are reported in the ﬁrst two col-
umns of table 11.5. To conserve space, the “excess returns—the diﬀerence
between the wage and productivity premiums, are reported directly. The
pattern is clearcut. Firms that face international competition reward char-
acteristics more in line with the productivity contributions they make. The
average gap between wage and productivity premiums, even excluding the
male premium, is 58.2 percent for ﬁrms that do not face international com-
petition and 45.4 percent for ﬁrms that do. Even though the standard
errors are somewhat smaller for the latter ﬁrms, the tests indicate that re-
jection of equality is more likely for ﬁrms not facing international compe-
tition.
The comparable average gap for the results with the individual-level es-
timator, reported in the last two columns of table 11.5, is 39.5 percent for
domestically oriented ﬁrms and 25.1 percent for ﬁrms competing with for-
eigners. The tests for equality are not very diﬀerent for the two samples, al-
though p-values are always lower for the domestically oriented ﬁrms. This
is mostly due to the much smaller gap for experience for ﬁrms exposed to
trade. Using either estimation method, ﬁrms competing with foreigners are
especially likely to equate wages to productivity premiums for the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics, tenure and training. Given that these are controlled
by the employee and can be adjusted over one’s career, incentives will be
more appropriate for employees of these ﬁrms. While the results in table
11.5 are somewhat sensitive to the controls included and to the way the
samples are divided, it does provide some evidence for the importance of
competition.













































18. Alternative answers to the question asking about the main source of competition were
(iv) none, or (v) domestic ﬁrms producing locally.
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A couple of ﬁndings are worth reiterating. First, wage premiums for a
number of characteristics do not always match productivity contributions,
and this failure is more pronounced for some countries than for others.
Second, a lot of attention in the development literature is devoted to edu-
cation, and rightfully so, because the returns in higher salary and output
are important and we only capture a fraction of them in this analysis. It is
nevertheless of concern that the wage increases associated with more edu-
cation signiﬁcantly exceed the productivity gains they bring in the least-
developed countries. On the other hand, it should be stressed that the re-
turns to education—privately and to the employers—are highest in the
most-developed country. Third, a crucial aspect of remuneration is the
trade-oﬀ between paying workers for general experience versus ﬁrm-
speciﬁc tenure. This mirrors a similar trade-oﬀ between preemployment
education and subsequent training. In Tanzania, and to a lesser extent in
Kenya, general skills (experience and schooling) are rewarded relatively
more than ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills (tenure and training). In Zimbabwe, wage
premiums match the productivity gains that are associated with them more













































Table 11.5 Estimation on separate samples by trade exposure (pooling ﬁrms from all countries)
Individual-level
estimation Firm-level estimation
Trade exposure? No Yes No Yes
Male –1.377 –0.278 –0.318 –1.703
(1.47) (.272) (.312) (.544)
Experience 1.054 0.560 0.773 0.251
(.489) (.323) (.113) (.128)
Schooling 0.404 0.586 0.488 0.497
(.251) (.297) (.150) (.151)
Tenure 0.447 –0.531 0.276 –0.216
(.234) (.811) (.195) (.233)
Received training –0.423 0.138 –0.050 0.041
(.552) (.297) (.222) (.158)
Test for equality of coefﬁcients in both equations (p-values)
Joint test—without male 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.01
Joint test—general HC 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01
Joint test—ﬁrm-speciﬁc HC 0.14 0.72 0.14 0.99
Observations 395 289 1988 1279
Note: Same estimation as in table 11.3, ﬁrst two columns, and table 11.4, last two columns.
Firms from all three countries are pooled: additional controls now include country-speciﬁc
time, location, and industry dummies. The reported coefﬁcients and standard errors are for
the difference between the wage and productivity premiums, the ‘excess return’ for each char-
acteristic. Groupings of characteristics for the joint tests are the same as in table 11.3.
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higher than in the other countries. Fourth, we oﬀer some suggestive evi-
dence that ﬁrms facing higher product market competition are more likely
to reward characteristics in line with their productivity contribution.
Data quality is often a concern when working with surveys from devel-
oping countries. As mentioned earlier, data issues have limited us to look
at only three countries and at a limited set of human capital characteristics.
It is our hope that these ﬁndings are suﬃciently interesting to spur other
researchers to check their robustness with other data sources and qualify
and reﬁne the results where needed.
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